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The Potential Effects of Kripps1 and C. N. 
Transportation2 on the Administration of the 
Criminal Justice System in Canada.
Introduction
T h e purpose o f this paper is to exam ine the responsibility o f the At­
torneys General o f  the provinces within the criminal justice svstem in light 
o f these two recent Suprem e C ourt o f C anada decisions. From a narrow 
point o f view the C ourt deals only with the prosecutorial jurisdiction o f 
the Attorney General o f  C anada in crim inal offences found in federal 
legislation outside the Crim inal Code. However, in reasoning and in state­
m ent the judgm ents seriously challenge the limits o f provincial constitu­
tional jurisdiction u n d er section 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867' and 
put in issue the duty o f the executive branch o f provincial governm ents to 
act within the crim inal justice system except as delegates o f the federal 
governm ent.
T he  broad constitutional issue u n d er consideration, as Laskin C.J.C. 
notes in (Ì.N. Transportation is the scope of provincial power un d er section 
92(14) and its relation to the federal power un d er section 91(27)’. While 
the decisions may clarify the law concerning prosecutorial jurisdiction, other 
functions such as policing, corrections and o ther ancillary services (which 
under the traditional v iew w ere thought to be included in section 92(14) 
u nder adm inistration of justice in the province) are now in dispute and 
are likely to be the object o f continuous litigation unless clarified by means 
of a reference to the courts o r by agreem ent between federal and provincial 
governm ents resulting in a constitutional am endm ent.
The Traditional Theory of Provincial Jurisdiction
It appears that the A ttorneys G eneral of the provinces can no longer 
relv on the frequently quoted  statem ents ol Dickson |. in Dilorio" and
R rginn nuil Ills  H iiiiiiui /m lg r  W rlm m r it Knftfis I ’htiinnii \ tinti S tr in i K npp \ i t  til ( I9MH). 7 ( ( ( ">ll7.
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l cast >ns t OIK u i l inn  in resul t In R ee l/  | an t i l a i n c i  | D is se n n i l i  I cast ms In Du kson |
l i »  I ninniti \  < \  I itinsfmilttlimt ¡ h i  m id  ( S  Railu a \ ( n i t  ni t I 9 M ) .  7 ( ( < l!<«li II**. I 't \  k  2 11 
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I y it I . t < ( t k  i Set n o n  92< 14). I lie a d m in is t r a t io n  ol |Ustii c in I lie p ros  nit e mt Imlmt'  d ie  t o u ­
st m u  ion man i tcna iH  e an ti  oi g a n i / a t i o n  ol p io v in t  i.il t o u r i s .  ImiiIi ol t m l  a n d  ol 11 minia i | in istlit l ion , anti 
int lu l ling p i o t c i l u i c  in t m l  m a n t i s  in tliost'  l i m i t s
I bui . set lion 91(27) . I h e  t i n n m a l  lavs. e x i c p i  the  i oii siiiiiiiihi ol m i n t s  o l t i n n n i a l  | tn istlit turn. I»ui 
ini Intimai d ie  piiK c t l m e  m l u m i n a l  m a t t c i s
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Putnam7 as defining the scope o f provincial constitutional jurisdiction within 
the crim inal justice system. In Kripps, Dickson J . reiterates the traditional 
theory (held by provincial A ttorneys General) based on the inclusion of 
provincial constitutional jurisdiction within section 92(14):
. . th e  A ltorn ev  (>eneral is th e  ch ie f law e n fo r c e m e n t o f f u e r o f  theC .row n  
hi eat li |)t o \  iik e: lie  has broad  resp o n sib ilities  fo i m ost a sp ec ts  o f th e  a d m in -  
istration  of justice, im  h id in g  th e  court svstem . the p o lice , n n n n ia l u n rsli 
gallon, prosecution a n d  corrections. I h e  p rovin cia l |M>lice are a n sw erab le  o n l\  
to  the  At tot n e \  ( ¿eneral. as are th e  p r o \ incial ( jxm  n A tlo rn ev s  w h o c o n d u c  t 
th e  great m ajorit\ of i rim inal p roset u tio n s in ( an .ida . I h ere  is n o  Mip|>oi t 
in th e  ((in stitu tio n  n or in th e  (te n s io n s  of this ( o m t  fo i th e  n o tion  of th e  
w ords "ad m in istration  of justice" sh o u ld  Ik- q u a lified  in such  in a n n e i that 
“justice” is m eant to  m ean  " ti\il justice". I h ere  is n o  n eed  to r e t im e  the  
leg isla tion  to  fu tih t\ l>\ rea d in g  in to  sec lion  I tl .1 lim itation  not th ere in  
e x p r e s se d .’’“ (K m p h asis a d d ed )
In  b o t h  K r ip p s  a n d  ( ' . .S .  T r a n s p o r ta t io n , D ic k s o n  ). ( f o l l o w i n g  his r e a ­
s o n i n g  in H a u s e r ") p r o v i d e s  a n  e x h a u s t i v e  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  l e g ­
islation u n d e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  f o r  p u r p o s e s  of c la s s if ic a t i o n .10 H e  t h e n  
re it e r a t e s  th e t r a d i t i o n a l  v ie w  o f  m o s t  p r o v in c i a l  A t t o r n e v s  G e n e r a l  c o n ­
c e r n i n g  th e  d iv is io n  o f  p o w e r s  w it h in  s e c t io n s  91 a n d  92 o f  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  
A r t ,  I S 6 7 :  that t h e r e  is a v a lid  d is t in c t io n  f o r  p r o s e c u t o r i a l  p u r p o s e s  b e t w e e n  
f e d e r a l  c r im in a l  a n d  n o i l - c r i m i n a l  le g is la t io n :  tli.it s e c t io n  92( 14) in c l u d e s  
th e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of c r i m i n a l  as  well .is <ivil ju stice  in th e  p r o v i n c e :  a n d  
that th e  p r o v i n c e s  h a v e  e x c l u s i v e  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  ju r is d ic t io n  o v e r  th e  p r o s ­
e c u t i o n  of all c r i m i n a l  o f f e n c e s  f o u n d  in f e d e r a l  l e g i s l a t i o n . "
The New Theory of Delegated Responsibility
1 .ask 111 ( |.( . e l i m i n a t e s  (In* f o l l o w i n g  p r o p o s i t i o n s  in th e  m ajoritx  
| u d g m e iit s :  tli.it t h e r e  is n o  \ .11u 1 d is t in c t io n  lot p r o s e t  u to ria l  p u r p o s e s  
b e t w e e n  f e d e r a l  < 1 i m m .1 l  a n d  11011-c 1 in iinal le g is la t io n , .is tin.- f e d e r a l  g o \ -  
e r n n i e n t  h a s  e x c l u s i v e  c o n s t it u t io n a l  ju r is d ic tio n  10  p r o s e c u t e  all f e d e r a l  
le g is la t io n :  that sec l io n  92( I 1) d o e s  not iik lu d e  (lie a d m i n i s i i a t i o n  of 1 1 m i ­
ni.il ju stice  .ind c a n n o t  in a m  w.i\ d i m m i s h  f e d e r a l  p o w e t  u n d e i  sectio n
\ ( .  \ lb t i l i is  I ’liliuim tl ill l l ' t h l i  tr_M ( ( I 11 "• I Dissent l>\ Dickson | at Ml 
'Sufim. footnote I. j l
H v // « u w r  ( r i 7 ‘.*l. < ( < (2cl l.i t  IKI
In knfifi*  the | >1 < >\ isi< ms (it the- h"inl a ml b u m  \i l iK S (  IMTli. i I _’7i nuclei c o ns id c t  a l u m  vs < i c 
catevjoi i/e-d .is t 111 n 1 n.tI l>v Du kson  | In t \  I iiiii\/miliillii>i. 1 onsidc’i ini’ the inovisioi is  ol the (.nml>iiu \ 
In; rstigulion l > / i k S (  | ‘l“ ll < ( J U  Dl< kson | < .itct’o i i/eel I lie Icjjlsl. il ioll .Is e iniilll. il . lull a lv i  .is i o im i in
II lie I d  the fed e ra l  tuclc- .mil c o m in c t  c e |h >v» ci \ \  it h .in a|>plic .it ion ol the  d m  n  m e  ol t e d c u l  |>aiainoiintc v
III t ips s i tu a tion  i.is o p p o s e d  to kuf>p' w h e ie  lie * alcgii i  i/eel tin levtisl.it ion .is solelx c i iniin.il I Dickson |
1 one l i n e d  in 1 csul ts  with th e  | iidvtnient ol I .ask in ( | ( . a l th o u g h  th e  d it lei c m  e in te .isoninv' lot niecl the  
(i.ims toi his lone  dis sen t ill Knfifiy
I nlcss .is in ( \  /  inn\fH>iliiliini. Iedet .i l  pa t a m o u n t .  v p ic vail s  It is intt lestmvt to n o te  tli.it Dickson  | 
colic III l e d  in the | in i till I—1 il o |  the  <oiiit  d e h v e i e d  tn M a i t l a n d  | in l{ \ I; / :  ( I ' l h l i .  '»7 ( ( ( ( J d l  '*7 
v\ l i e ie  it was dec ided  tha t th e  t e d e i  al e m i n e n t  h a d  c iinstiiiition.il  | in  isdu lion to piosee u le  a c li.il ge  ol 
co lis |>nac\  ii nde l  th e  l u m in a l  < <«I> lelatinvi to  tile ini |*ol ta l ion  ol nalc otic s c o n t l a i  \ to th e  S a n  nln I nnliol 
\ i !  K s c l ‘* 7 n . . X I
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91(27) (which includes the prosecutorial function) and that the Attorneys 
General o f  the provinces are involved in the prosecution o f crim inal and 
o ther federal legislation12 only because o f a delegation by the federal gov­
ernm ent as found in the definition o f A ttorney General in section 2 of the 
Criminal Code.1*
It is difficult, however, (if not impossible) to find a precedent within 
the Canadian experience with which the delegation o f prosecutorial re­
sponsibility can be com pared .“  As there is no elaboration by I .as kin C.J.C. 
as to the natu re o f  the delegation, one must assum e that he contem plates 
a delegation similar in natu re to his dissenting analysis in Dilorio concerning 
police functions:
In fact, it iso p e n  to the Federal Parliament to invest proviiu ial functionaries 
or courts with federal functions under federal legislation, regardless of 
w hether thev are endow ed with capacitv In provincial legislation . . '
It is subm itted that the delegation of prosecutorial authority  to the 
A ttorneys General of the provinces under the new theory is not analogous 
to the investm ent of provincial functionaries o r courts with federal func­
tions as it does not recognize the role of the A ttorney G eneral of the 
province as chief law enforcem ent of ficer, nor does it deal with the question
' -See  H \ Sam bir und P au l ( I9N3), I ( ,(!.(.  ct«|) I tti a r g u e d  a t l e i  Kn/>/>\ .1 n<I I Y iitin\ftt»htti<in. with 
j u d g m e n t  p r o n o u n c e d  I» d ie  C o u r t  o n  F ebruar*  9. I9N3. lo  th e  e l i c i t  tha t n o  lo n s t i t u t i o n a l  qu es t ion s  
w ere  ra ised  o n  a p r o s e« u t ion  bv th e  p ro v i iu ia l  au th o r i t i e s  o t an  o f f e n c e  u n d e r  t h e  Fisheries Art. R S.t 
1970. i .  F-14.
'Mt is d e a r  tha t  Laskin  ( J A . . 111 his iu d g m c i i t s  has  ca teg o r iz ed  th e  issut- as o n e  invo lv ing  d e l eg a t io n  ol 
p r o secu to r ia l  a u t h o n tv .  H e  uses  th e  following let mm olo gv  111 (. S  /  iaii\fx>rtation. (at I 'm )  . set lion 
of “A t t o r n o  Cieneral  . e m b r a c e s  t h e  A l to rn ev  ( ren e ra i  . of a provili««- it was th e  l e d e r a i  p a r l iam en ts '  
de< ision to giv«- g en e ra l  prose« ut m g  a u t h o r  11 \ to th e  p r o \  m« lai \ t t o i  n e \ s  ( . ene ra l" ;  (.11 -!♦> I ) " t e d e ra i  
legislat ion  e m b r a c e d  th e  p ro v i iu ia l  A t t o r n o  Cieneral . with in  th e  s«o|k- o l its « u m i l ia i  e n a c tm e n ts  
a n d  (at tb.3) . it « a n n o i  t>e .11 g u e d  tha t  p a r l i a m e n t  c o n f e r s  prose« u to n a l  a u t h o i i t \  onlv with t h e  « oust 111 
ot th e  provil i«es. t o r  th is  w ould  involve an  un con s t i tu t io n a l  de l eg a t io n  ol legislat ive (xiwei In Aim/»/» 
(at .r> 10) l .ask in  C . |  ('.. r e f e r s  lo . p re s c r ip t io n s  th a t as s ign p rose«u to r ia l  a u t h o n t v  to  t h e  p ro v i iu ia l  
A lio rney  ( . e n e r a l  l)u  k son | m kn ftp s  (at 519)  s um  mai i/es  1 lit- f ed e ra l  ai gu incut as follow s I In \ i t o i  ncv 
( . ene i al of  C a n a d a  ta kes  th e  |>osition that t h e  des ig na i ion o t th e  p to v  in« 1.1I A lto rnev  ( . en e i  al as the "Atlo i n«-v 
Cieneral" to i th e  p u r p o s e s  of th e  C.nm m at ('.ode is not «ons ii tu iion .i l  bu t s ta tu lo iv .  th e  result  ol th e  f ed e i a l  
p a i l iam ent e x e r o s m g  its legislative l o m p e t e u c e  to d e l eg a te  prose« 11(0 1 1.1I a u t h o n t v  to  a prov in« lai of f« lai
II th e  t e d e i a l  p a r l i am en t  has  th e  a u t h o n tv  to e n a t i  ilus legislat ion,  th e n  11 will h av e  th e  s a m e  a u th o i i tv  .11
auv l im e  to t e r m in a le  it." A l th o u g h  th e  d e l eg a t io n  a p p r o a c h  is «ai led th e  new tl ieorv .  111 1 Ins p a p e r ,  it was 
th e  fed e ra l  e x p la n a t i o n  lo t th e  I 'Mi1) a m e n d m e n t  to th e  d e f in i t io n  ol A t lo m e v  t . e n e i a l  in the  < um iliai 
(m ir  See. "Minutes  of P r o c e e d in g s  ol th e  S tan d in g  C o m m i t t e e  o n  |u s ti«e  a n d  Legal  M la i i s  ( M a n l i  1. 
19ti9) at 155. w h e r e  th e  t h e n  M u n s t e r  ol |usii«e . | o h n  I t i n ie r ,  s ta ted  tha t t h e  p ro s e« u to r i a l  1 «-s|m»11 sibili 1 v 
ol d ie  prov  111« tal A t lo m ev  ( . en e ra l  was onlv th a t « oik  e d e d  bv I 'at l iam ent.  See  al so  La hoi esl ( . . ,  Delega tion 
of Legisla tive Power in C a n a d a " .  ( 1975) 21 M r fii l lI  /  131 at 133 " t e d e i a l  P a r l i am e n t  t a n .  in t h e e x e n  isc 
of its p a r a m o u n t  jx iwer  o v e r  «u m i l ia i  lav«, vest die  a d m in is t r a t io n  ol «11m m . 1l law in p e r s o n s  o d ic i  ih .in
prov in« 1.1I au tho r i t i e s " .
14 For  e x a m p le ,  the  p r o v u i i c s  have «o ns ti tu iiona l |ui isdu t ion  u n i l e i  S e d io l i  92(1 li  lo t d ie  «oi is ti iu tion.  
m alm enali«  e a n d  o r g a n iz a t io n  of p ro v i iu ia l  cour ts , b o th  ol  t ivil  a n d  « u m i l ia i  (ill isdx l ion  while the  
l e d e ia l  g o v e r n m e n t  has  ««institutional ju r isd ic tion  u n d e i  sect ion  9*i foi a p p o i n t m e n t  ol |u«lges lot d ie  
su p e r io r ,  d is tr ict  a n d  «ountv l o u i t s  I Inis, while the  ac tions  ol  a pro vinc ia l g o v e r n m e n t  mav have  «osi 
c o n s e q u e n c e s  o n  th e  f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t .  01 v m  ie r\a . Ixttli a r e  . u t i n g  wi t hi n t h e n  ie sp e« l ive  .n ea s  ol 
con s t i tu t io n a l  respons ib i l i iv . a n d  th e r e  is 1 10 de lega i  1011 o l legislative 01 a d m in is t r a t iv e  tun« (i«>iis. In« 01111 a s t . 
the  d e l e g a t io n  of p r o s e « u to n a l  a u t h o n t v  to  the  p r ov i iu ia l  \ t t o r n c v s  ( . e n e i a l  im p ose s  a liliali«lai b u r d e n  
on  p ro v i iu ia l  g o v e r n m e n t s  in .111 a r e a  w h e r e  tliev have  110 «ons t i tu i io n a l  jut isiIk lion
' 'Supra , f o o tn o te  *>. at 301
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of political accountability for the adm inistration of the criminal justice 
system in the province.1*4
Section 92(14) As Limited By The New Theory
Laskin C.J.C., in C.N. Transportation , states that the clear language of 
section 92(14) narrow s the scope of the federal criminal law power only 
with respect to what is included in the constitution, m aintenance and o r­
ganization of provincial courts or crim inal jurisdiction. He categorically 
rejects (as being unsupported  by history, logic, o r gram m ar) the traditional 
theory that section 92(14) includes criminal, as well as civil, justice.
i) Prosecutions
U nder the new theory the prosecutorial function is included within 
the scope of criminal procedure. T he  judgm ents clearly indicate that 
the provinces have no independent constitutional jurisdiction with 
respect to the prosecution of criminal of f ences and only have authority 
to act in this field because of the delegation by the federal governm ent 
of prosecutorial responsibility to the Attorneys General of the prov­
inces as found in the Criminal Code}"
ii) Policing
Although there is no specific reference to o ther areas within the ambit 
of the crim inal justice system that might be affected bv the limitations 
of section 92(14) under the new theory, support for the proposition 
that the policing function must follow the prosecutorial function is 
based on reliance bv Laskin C.J.C. on the following portions of the 
judgm ents of Spence J. in Hauser, and  of Martin J.A. in Hoff wan— 
LaRoche'H. which include statem ents linking the two functions on a 
constitutional basis. As noted bv Spence J.:
'"As n o te d  bv R an d  | . in \.(< \ ovii Srotui v U >  (u n a d u  11 95 1 1 S ( K I th e  tl ieorv <>f d e leg a t ion  implies  
s u b o r d i n a t i o n —q u o t i n g  I ro n i  H odgr v The Q u rm  ( INHS). 9  A p p  ( a s  I I T a i  l< ‘_’ it r e ta in s  th e  (Miners 
in tact ,  a n d  ca n ,  w h e n e v e r  n pleases , d e s t r o s  th e  ag en t  \ n has  c re a te d  a n d  sei u p  a n o t h e r .  o t la ke  the  
mat ter.  d u ec t lv  in to  his o w n  h a n d s  A ss u m in g  th e  d e l e g a t io n  in t h e  < nm itu il (.«dr is h ro a d  e n o u g h  10 
in« lu d e  all t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  su |i e i  visors Iiiih turns  ol I h e  A llo t u e \  < •enera l in re la t ion  to  th e  c m u t u a l  | tisiu e 
s ss te m  th e  u l i im a te  | m >lit i< a I respons ibil itv  lo r  t h e  a d u u i u s t r a t i o u  m ust r e m a in  w uh  the  l e d e ra l  \ t t o i n e s  
( •en e ra l  an s w e ra b le  to  P a r l i am e n t  u n d e t  th e  tli«->>i\ o l le sjwmsible g o v e r n m e n t  | I | h d w a id s  in M in ­
isterial Kesfioiisihilitv f<>i \ a i i o n a l  S rcu r i tv " .  I9N0. in d i a p t e t  3 ex a m in e s  th e  p ro b le m  a n d  no te s  the  
t( insi st en t den ia ls  o l res|M>nsibiln\ I ro in  sn< < ess ise  l e d e r a l  \ t t o t  n e s s  ( >eneral w h e n  ( |ues t ion ed  m m  e r n i n g  
in c id en ts  of a l leged  m i s m a n a g e m e n t  o l t h e  a d m im s i i a i i o n  of « i im m a l  | i i s tn e  in ilu- p io v m c c
' In r e t ro sp ec t ,  (lie d e l e g a t io n  ol p ro secu to r ia l  a u t h o n t s  to  the  A t to r n e ss  (>enera!  ol tlit- p rov inces  lias 
resu l ted  in s ig n i fu a n l  e x p e n d i t u r e s  bv th e  p rov inces  with in  ilic- field of cr im in a l  piosec u iions  W o u ld  a 
similar d e l eg a t io n  bv a provinc ia l le g is la tu re  of p ro secu to r ia l  a u t h o n t s  for  p io v incia l legislation lo the  
A t to r n e s  (»enera l *>f C a n a d a  le su l i in a du lv  o n  th e  l e d e i a l  g o v e r n in e n i  lo  ex|M*nd lu n d s  10 ach ieve  the  
p in  p< isc ot t h e  d e leg a t ion ?  I h e  an sw er ,  o l  course .  c o m es  in I lie- a rea  of |>olicmg. w h e ie .  u n d e i  d ie  new 
iheo iv  of d e l e g a te d  res jionsib ili ties {as im pl ied  bv l askin  ( | ( I. n u m e r o u s  e x a m p le s  ot an  an a lo g o u s  
d e leg a t io n  in legis lat ion  of provinc ia l a n d  m un ic ip a l  e n f o r c e m e n t  d u t ie s  to  the  K< M P bv co n t tac t  
p rov inces  »an  be c it ed  I h e  f e d e ra l  g o v e r n m e n t  has  alwavs  t a k e n  th e  position tha t serv i< c-s of th e  K < Nl P 
c an  be w it lid raw n il pav m en !  is not forth» cuning  foi tins eiilcnc e in en t  sci v u c- I he  unplic at ion  is I li.it. as 
a de leg a te ,  t h e r e  is no  | m >s i h v c  dutv  to act w ithou t p av m en i
,hH V H offnuni— l.a R ixh r  l  ui ( 19HI >. J  » < K ( 3 d I 19:1
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If the legislative held is within the enum erated heads o f  section 91, then  
the final decision as to adm inistrative policy, investigation and prosecution  
must be in federal han ds.19;
and by M artin J.A .;
Since the investigative function is validlv vested in federal officers, the au­
thority o f  Parliament to em pow er the Attornev General of Canada to initiate 
the conduct prosecution under the Act is necessarilv incidental or ancillarv 
to the schem e o f  the legislation, or to use the language o f  Laskin |.A . (as 
he then was) in P app  v. P app . . . “there is a rational, functional connection"  
lx*tween the investigative procedures provided for in the Act and the vesting  
o f  prosecutorial power in the Attorney G eneral of Canada . . .
In my view the vesting of prosecutorial pow ers in the A ttorne\ G eneral of 
Canada in respect of violations of the Combines Investigation Art does not 
offen d  anv constitutional principle or am  understanding that max have 
existed at the tim e o f  C onfederation with respect to the enforcem ent of the 
criminal law.*'
O ne must also seriously consider the dissenting statem ents of Laskin 
C.J.C., in D ilorio , which appear to affirm  that delegation also applies 
to the policing function un d er the new theory:
T h e pow er o f  a Province, or of a m unicipality by delegation  from  a Province, 
to establish provincial or local police forces is unquestioned . . . T h e  m ere 
establishm ent of a police force, and even  the endow m ent of the police  
officers with statutory powers under provincial legislation, does not. ipso 
facto , give them  authority to exercise those pow ers if such exercise would  
taken them  into the held o f  crim inal law enforcem ent as contrasted with 
the en forcem en t o f  m unicipal by-laws or provincial penal laws . . . In my 
opinion, the suggestion that there is some independent authority m provincial in 
m unicipal police forces, independent that is o f  federal legislation, to enforce the 
crim inal law, an d  that this independent authority is fed by section N )  is simply 
untenable . . . T o  the extent to which enforcem ent o f  the crim inal law is left 
with provincial or m unicipal police forces, it is there bv virtue o f  federal 
law or bv the continuation of pre-C onfederation powers left untouched b\ 
federal law.21 (Em phasis added)
iii) C orrections
It is difficult to determ ine the effect of the judgm ents on the correc­
tional aspects o f the criminal justice system ," although there might 
be a broader basis from  which to argue provincial constitutional ju­
risdiction. As noted in the Ouirnent Report, 1969:
‘‘‘As q u o te d  In I .ask in C . | . C  m (. V Transportation Supra, fo o tn o te  2. .it 177
bid.
2I.Supra, fo o tn o te  6, at 304-305 .
**U nder  the  (Constitution Art. ! S b 7 th e  p ro v in c e  in sect ion ‘*2(b| is res|M>nsible lo t  the  e s ta b l ishm e n t ,  m a in ­
t e n a n c e  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  of public a n d  re f o r m a to r y  p r iso n s  m a n d  to r  th e  p ro v inc e  whi le  d ie  fede ta l  
g o v e r n m e n t  iii sect ion 9I(2N) is r espons ib le  fo r  the  e s t a b l i s h m e n t . m a in t e n a n c e  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  of j>en- 
Hentiar ies  In  a c c o r d a n c e  with  fed e ra l  legisla tion a n d  p ro v in c ia l -f e d era l  a g r e e m e n t s  th e  p rov inces  have  
a s s u m e d  all f u nc t io na l  a n d  financ ia l tesponsib il itv  for  p e r s o n s  se n te n c e d  to less t h a n  two years  a n d  have 
ex ten s iv e  serv ices  d ea l in g  wi th all as pects  of p r o b a t io n  111 c r im in a l  m atte rs .
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I he Hnlish Xorth America Ari places responsibility l'or all services (hai have 
a treat m eni connotation with the provinces. Involved are medical services 
(including mental health), welfare and education. I his m a\ explain what 
prom pted the present division of responsibility between the levels ot goy- 
ernm ent. Those prisoners w ho received a sentence ol less than two vears 
were prohahlv regarded as ordinary people who needed a lesson while those 
who received longer sentences were seen as t riminals whom  it was necessary 
to separate from  ordinary people. I his assum ption is supported h\ the  
term inology used in the British Xorth America Act where the lederai insti­
tutions are called "penitentiaries" while the provincial institutions are called 
“reform atory prisons’’.- ’
However the most obvious justification (before Kripps and C. X.  Trans­
portation) to account f or the significant expend itu re o f provinc ial f unds 
in the area of corrections was the traditional theory (as noted by 
Dickson |.) that the provinces had constitutional jurisdiction under 
section 92(14) which was reflected in the division of responsibilities 
found in federal legislation.
With the limitation o f section 92(14). it is m ore logical to assume 
that the federal criminal procedure power, com bined with section 
91(28), limits provincial constitutional jurisdiction under sec tion 92(b) 
to persons incarcerated un d er provincial legislation and that the prov­
inces act within the field of correc tions onlv as a delegate of the federal 
governm ent.
iv) Ancillary Services
O ther ancillary services-' have been established In the provinces to 
discharge what have been perceived to Ik* ancillary obligations under 
section 92(14). It follows that with proclam ation of the federal Young 
Offenders A ct,-'' expenditures in this area will be significantly increased. 
Analogous to the submission dealing with policing and corrections, 
the logical effect of the judgm ents is to put in question provincial 
constitutional jurisdiction and the duty to ac t in this area of the c rim ­
in. il justice system except as a delegate of the federal governm ent.
The Potential Effects On The Administration Of The Criminal Justice 
System In Canada
It is subm itted that the m ajor effects of the- judgm ents are «is follows: 
1) the* nature and scope of the delegation will become the- object of con­
tinuous litigation-'1; 2) tlie* traditional ilieorv <»f the political accountability
- ’ 'K« |x iri  <>l ilu ( . ii i.kIi. ii i  ( o m n n i i c f  m i  ( .01 t e i  lions  l'M»M. .it
'Sui li as « m m n . 11 legal aid a n d  t in - t r a n s p u t  lai ion ol  m d iw d t ia l s  s en te tu  e d  1« h « i n inna i  oIIi-ih es  io m e n t io n  
imo obvious  ex am ples .
S< IMHtl-Hl K'J. « III)
‘' h o i  e x a m p le  H is l ion  o p e n  Io « h a l l f l l g f  till piose« ulioii ol a I im m uti < "ih o l i e n t e  li '  the  Xllotuev 
C•ent ia l ol lire p u n i r n e  o n  ili« basis (hai d ie  d e l eg a t io n  as to nn i !  in d ie  < <«/< go«s so lai dia l il u  siilts in 
to m p le i e  a lx l i t a t io n .  a b a n d o n m e n t  01 s u n e n t l e i  ol p o n e i  l>\ d ie  l e d e i  al g o v e r n m e n t  i \ l so  as n o n  il m 
l l o g g .  C o n s t i t u t io n a l  1 an  ol C.anatla. al -  I T t h e n  is a ln av s  d ie  tlal lgel  tha t all ex« e plionallv limat i am i 
vaglie t le le gallon  miglit  Ih tlassi lie tl  as a d e l eg a t io n  ot legislative pttvvei i II imsiit  11 sstni.  ali allei nativi 
a p p m a t h  m igh t Ik- tha t th e  del«-g a l lo n  is so n a i l o n  that inanv ot iIn t i in t i io n s  n o n  pt i l o n m  d  In tilt 
\ t l o r n e v s  ( . ene i al o l the  ptov lilt es  hi th è  11 im m al  | iistu e h e ld  ai e ou t s id e  tilt st op t ol llit de leg a i  li m
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of the A ttorney G eneral of the province to the legislature for the adm in­
istration of the crim inal justice system will be seriously challenged27; and 
3) the provincial governm ents will become increasingly reluctant to incur 
expenditures as a delegate o f the federal governm ent u n d er existing or 
proposed legislation, notw ithstanding the traditional role o f the Attorney 
General o f  the province within the crim inal justice system.-8
G RA N T SM YTH GARNEAU*
- ' I t  in su b m i t te d  th.it this will follow the  norm . i l  ro u t e  t h r o u g h  th e  |>ohiital p ro cess  hut will Ik- d i r e c te d  to 
the  \ t t o r n c \  (.<-nei.il o t ( a n a t la  m  P ar l i am en t  Is it now o | k - i i  to i th e  fed e ra l  g o v e r n  m e n t  to avoid |x>htital 
at ( i >u 111 a I >i 111 v tes|M'i ting I lie p ro se t  ut ion  ot < r nil mal of f e m e s  in l fie prov  me es-
"While prov  i i k  lal g o v e r n m e n t s  inav I k - l e l i u t a n t  to d i s m p t  t h e  svs tem  of justi ce hv ch a l len g in g  exis ting  
ai r a n g e m e n t s  w fix h have woi ked  leasonah lv  well siik e ( o n f e d e i  at ion  t h e r e  has  Iteen a ret c m  p ro l i f e ra t io n  
i>t legislative pro|x>sals f 10111 t h e  fed e ra l  gove i l im en t  w hu  h dire*11v a t fe i t th e  t ru i im a l  justice sv s tem  an d  
which will p ro v e  lostlv for t h e  p r o v în t e s  to im p le m e n t  I he  Young ( ) f fr n d n \ \c t  is a classic e x a m p le .  \ s  
tins tr / ini h id es  all as|>et Is o t t h e  t r imiiial  |ustic c sv s te m  u n d e i  t o n s id e l  at ion  ah o ve .  prov  iih lal cons t i tu t iona l  
jurist lu Iioii a n d  th e  e n s u in g  dut v of th e  exe t u tive  b r a n t  h of t h e  prov iik i.iI g o v e r n m e n t s  to e x p e n d  f unt ls  
to im p le m e n t  p iov is ions  ot d ie  \< I a r e  now seno u s lv  an  issut- In  a |>eriod of s evere  e t o n o m i t  re s t r a in t  it 
is unlikelv tha t prov mt lal govet n in e u t s  w ill t>e w illmg to i i k  tit la rg e  e x p e n d  it t i res  as de lega te s  of t h e  federa l  
g o v e r n m e n t  Lega l o p in io n  a n d  logit sup |>oi t th e  view dia l I’a i h a m e n t  t . i n n o t  use  a \ |>eiitn d é léga t io n  ol 
au thor i tv  to  a n  e x e t u n v e  o f f i t e i  of p ro v in t  lal g o v e r n m e n t  as a m e a n s  of t r a n s f e r r i n g  to  (fie p io v in te s .  
against t h e n  will, l e sp in s i ln l i t ie s  to t f u nd i ng  fe d e ra l  p r o g r a m s
*( I) It A M \  I I B ( liit-f ( t i r o n e r  ( Ih ie t S h e i i l l . D e p a r im e n t  of |u s ti t  e. I’rt»vinte of New Bi unswick
